Thursday, June 2, 2011

FPJ - Black 9/11: A Walk on the Dark Side - Second in a series

http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2011/03/02/black-911-a-walk-on-the-dark-side-2/0/ http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2011/03/02/black-911-a-walk-on-the-dark-side-2/0/
ENGLISH
PORTUGUÊS
FOREIGN POLICY JOURNAL JORNAL DE POLÍTICA EXTERNA
Black 9/11: A Walk on the Dark Side
Second in a series
11/9 Negro: Caminhada no Lado Trevoso
Segundo de uma série
by Mark H. Gaffney
March 2, 2011
por Mark H. Gaffney
2 de março de 2011
This paper will review the evidence for informed, or insider, trading in the days and hours before the 9/11 attacks. From the very first, the phenomenon appeared to be world-wide.  One consultant, Jonathan Winer, told ABC: “it’s absolutely unprecedented to see cases of insider trading covering the entire world from Japan to the US to North America to Europe.”[1] The list of affected nations was long, and included the US, Germany, Japan, France, Luxembourg, Hong Kong, the UK, Switzerland and Spain.[2] Soon, independent investigations were underway on three continents in the belief that the paper trail would lead to the terrorists. Este texto examinará evidências relativas a informed trading, ou insider trading [o crime de usar informações secretas que você tenha a respeito de uma empresa, ou conhecimento que você tenha de uma situação, para comprar ou vender ações com lucro - ver Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English, online], nos dias e horas antes dos ataques do 11/9. Desde bem no início o fenômeno deu impressão de ser mundial. Um consultor, Jonathan Winer, disse à ABC: “é algo absolutamente sem precedentes ver casos de insider trading cobrindo o mundo todo, de Japão a América do Norte e Europa.”[1] A lista de nações afetadas era longa, e incluía os Estados Unidos, Alemanha, Japão, França, Luxemburgo, Hong Kong, Reino Unido, Suíça e Espanha.[2] Cedo investigações independentes estavam em andamento em três continentes a partir da crença de que o rastro de papéis levaria aos terroristas.
Press statements by leading figures in the international banking community left little doubt that the evidence was compelling. Ernst Welteke, President of the German Deutsche Bundesbank, told reporters that “a preliminary review by German regulators and bank researchers showed there were highly suspicious sales of shares in airlines and insurance companies, along with major trades in gold and oil markets, before September 11 that suggest….advance knowledge of the attacks. Welteke said that his researchers came across….almost irrefutable proof of insider trading.”  Welteke was blunt: “What we found makes us sure that people connected to the terrorists must have been trying to profit from this tragedy.”[3] Declarações na imprensa por figuras de proa na comunidade bancária internacional deixaram pouca dúvida de que a evidência era irresistível. Ernst Welteke, Presidente do alemão Deutsche Bundesbank, disse a repórteres que “exame preliminar por parte dos regulamentadores alemães e pesquisadores de bancos mostrou haver vendas de ações muito suspeitas de empresas aéreas e companhias de seguros e grandes negócios nos mercados de ouro e de petróleo antes do 11 de setembro, que sugerem....conhecimento antecipado dos ataques. Welteke disse que seus pesquisadores encontraram....prova quase irrefutável de insider trading.”  Welteke foi direto: “O que encontramos torna-nos certos de que pessoas conexas com os terroristas só podiam estar tentando lucrar com essa tragédia.”[3]
In the U.K., London City regulators investigated a flurry of suspicious sales processed just before the attack.[4] “The Financial Services Authority (FSA), a stock market watchdog, was drawn into the investigation because it had a transaction monitoring department that checks suspicious share movements.” An FSA spokesperson confirmed that market regulators in Germany, Japan and the U.S. had received information about short selling of insurance company shares and airline stocks, which fell sharply as a result of the attacks. Among the WTC tenants were dozens of banks and insurance companies, including several that were now going to have to pay out billions to cover heavy losses from the attacks.[5] No Reino Unido, regulamentadores da City de Londres investigaram uma enxurrada de vendas suspeitas processadas logo antes do ataque.[4] “A Autoridade de Serviços Financeiros (FSA), fiscalizadora do mercado de ações, envolveu-se na investigação porque tinha um departamento de acompanhamento de transações que verificava movimentos suspeitos de ações.” Porta-voz da FSA confirmou que regulamentadores do mercado em Alemanha, Japão e Estados Unidos haviam recebido informação acerca de vendas a descoberto de ações de companhias de seguros e de empresas aéreas, que caíram abruptamente em decorrência dos ataques. Entre os inquilinos do WTC havia dúzias de bancos e companhias de seguros, inclusive diversos que agora teriam de pagar biliões de dólares para cobrir pesadas perdas decorrentes dos ataques.[5]
Assuming nefarious individuals were armed with foreknowledge, they stood to make a windfall by dumping stock and selling competitors short, not to mention the vast potential profits from last-minute electronic money laundering via computers which, the perpetrators had to know, would be destroyed within hours. Richard Crossley, a London analyst, stated that he had tracked suspicious short selling and share dumping in a swath of stocks. CBS likewise reported a sharp upsurge in purchases of put options on both United and American Airlines.[6] The uptick had occurred in the days prior to 9/11. A put option is a contract that allows the holder to sell a stock at a specified price, within a certain time period. Sources on Wall Street told CBS that before 9/11 they had never seen that kind of trading imbalance. The only airlines affected were United and American, the two involved in the attack. American Airlines stock reportedly fell 39% in a single day. United Airlines stock dropped even more, by a whopping 44%. Assumindo-se que indivíduos abomináveis detinham conhecimento prévio, estavam em condições de ganhar uma fortuna fazendo dump de ações e vendendo a descoberto competidores, para não mencionar os vastos lucros em potencial de lavagem de dinheiro eletrônico de último minuto via computadores que, os perpretadores forçosamente saberiam, seriam destruídos dentro de horas. Richard Crossley, analista de Londres, declarou ter rastreado vendas a descoberto suspeitas e dump de ações envolvendo diversas ações. Analogamente, a CBS noticiou agudo aumento nas compras de opções de venda referentes tanto a United Airlines quanto a American Airlines.[6] O aumento súbito ocorreu nos dias anteriores ao 11/9. Uma opção de venda é um contrato que permite ao detentor vender uma ação por preço especificado, dentro de determinado período de tempo. Fontes de Wall Street disseram à CBS que, antes do 11/9, nunca haviam visto aquele tipo de desequilíbrio dos negócios. As únicas empresas aéreas afetadas foram United e American, as duas envolvidas no ataque. As ações da American Airlines teriam caído 39% num só dia. As ações da United Airlines caíram ainda mais, impressionantes 44%.
Although many stocks tumbled, there were also big winners, especially in the military sector. Contractors like L-3 Communications, Allied Techsystems and Northrop Grumman all reported large gains.[7] The biggest winner, though, was Raytheon, which manufactures Tomahawk missiles. During the week following the 9/11 attacks, Raytheon stock climbed by an astounding 37%.[8] Prior to 9/11, the purchase of call options (a contract to buy a stock at a certain price) for Raytheon had suspiciously surged by 600%. Embora muitas ações tenham despencado, houve também grandes ganhadores, especialmente no setor militar. Empreiteiras tais como L-3 Communications, Allied Techsystems e Northrop Grumman relataram, todas, grandes ganhos.[7] A maior ganhadora, contudo, foi a Raytheon, que fabrica mísseis Tomahawk. Na semana posterior aos ataques do 11/9 as ações da Raytheon subiram espetaculares 37%.[8] Antes do 11/9, a compra de opções de compra (contrato para compra de ação por certo preço) da Raytheon subira, suspeitamente, 600%.
The sale of five-year U.S. Treasury Notes also spiked just before 9/11, as reported by the Wall Street Journal.[9] Among the purchases was a single $5 billion transaction, which pointed to large investors. The Journal explained that “Treasury notes are among the best investments in the event of a world crisis, especially one that hits the US. The notes are prized for their safety and their backing by the U.S. government, and usually rally when investors flee riskier investments, such as stocks.” Michael Shamosh, a bond-market strategist for Tucker Anthony Inc., told the Journal:  “If they were going to do something like this they would do it in the five-year part of the market. [Because] It’s extremely liquid, and the tracks would be hard to spot.” The article added that “The value of these notes has risen sharply since the events of September 11.” A venda de Notas do Tesouro dos Estados Unidos também disparou logo antes do 11/9, como informado pelo Wall Street Journal.[9] Entre as compras estava uma transação única de $5 biliões de dólares, que apontava para grandes investidores. O Journal explicou que “as notas do Tesouro contam-se entre os melhores investimentos na eventualidade de uma crise mundial, especialmente quando atinja os Estados Unidos. As notas são muito procuradas por sua segurança e pelo apoio a elas por parte do governo dos Estados Unidos, e usualmente sobem quando os investidores fogem de investimentos mais arriscados, tais como ações.” Michael Shamosh, estrategista do mercado de títulos da Tucker Anthony Inc., disse ao Journal:  “Se eles quisessem fazer algo da espécie eles o fariam na parte de cinco anos do mercado. [Porque] é extremamente líquida, e os rastros seriam difíceis de seguir.” O artigo acrescentou que “O valor dessas notas aumentou acentuadamente desde os eventos do 11 de setembro.”
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) launched its own probe into allegations of insider trading. For weeks, the SEC remained close-mouthed about the scope of its investigation, then, in mid-October, sent out a request to securities firms around the world for more information regarding a list of 38 different stocks.[10] SEC Chairman Harvey Pitt told the House Financial Services Committee that “We will do everything in our power to track those people down and bring them to justice.”[11] By this time, however, the fix was in. A Comissão de Valores Mobiliários (SEC) deflagrou sua própria investigação no tocante a alegações de insider trading. Durante semanas a SEC ficou em silêncio a respeito da abrangência de sua investigação e então, em meado outubro, enviou pedido a firmas de títulos mobiliários no mundo inteiro de informações relativas a uma lista de 38 diferentes ações.[10] O Chairman da SEC Harvey Pitt disse à Comissão de Serviços Financeiros da Câmara que “Faremos tudo em nosso poder para rastrear essas pessoas até capturá-las e levá-las à justiça.”[11] A essa altura, contudo, os dados já estavam viciados.
The San Francisco Chronicle reported that the SEC took the unprecedented step of deputizing “hundreds, if not thousands, of key players in the private sector.”[12] Wrote the Chronicle: “In a two-page statement issued to ‘all securities-related entities’ nationwide, the SEC asked companies to designate senior personnel who appreciate ‘the sensitive nature’ of the case and can be relied upon to ‘exercise appropriate discretion’ as ‘point’ people linking government investigators and the industry.” The requested information was to be held in strictest confidence. The SEC statement included the following passage (emphasis added): “We ask that you disseminate the information within your institution only on a need-to-know basis.” O San Francisco Chronicle informou que a SEC tomou a providência sem precedentes de investir em funções oficiais “centenas, se não milhares, de figuras fundamentais do setor privado.”[12] Escreveu o Chronicle: “Numa declaração de duas páginas divulgadas para ‘todas as entidades relacionadas com títulos mobiliários’ do país, a SEC pediu às empresas para nomearem pessoal sênior que entendesse ‘a natureza delicada’ do caso e no qual se pudesse confiar para ‘exercer discrição apropriada’ como pessoas de ‘vanguarda’ ligando investigadores de governo e área financeira.” As informações solicitadas seriam mantidas na mais estrita confidencialidade. O enunciado da SEC incluía a seguinte passagem (ênfase acrescentada): “Pedimos aos senhores que disseminem as informações dentro de sua instituição apenas na medida em que necessário.”
In his book “Crossing the Rubicon”, former LAPD detective Mike Ruppert explains the SEC’s unprecedented move to deputize: Em seu livro “O Cruzamento do Rubidão”, o ex-detetive do Departamento de Polícia de Los Angeles -  LAPD Mike Ruppert explica a providência sem precedentes da SEC de investir pessoas em funções oficiais:
What happens when you deputize someone in a national security or criminal investigation is that you make it illegal for them to disclose publicly what they know…. In effect, they become government agents and are controlled by government regulations rather than their own conscience. In fact, they can be thrown in jail without a hearing if they talk publicly. I have seen this implied threat time and again with federal investigations, intelligence agents, and even members of the United States Congress who are bound so tightly by secrecy oaths and agreements that they are not even able to disclose criminal activities inside the government for fear of incarceration.[13] O que acontece quando você atribui funções oficiais a alguém numa investigação de segurança nacional ou criminal é você tornar ilegal essas pessoas revelarem publicamente o que sabem.... Com efeito, elas se tornam agentes do governo e são controladas pela regulamentação do governo em vez de pela própria consciência. Na verdade, elas poderão ser jogadas na prisão sem audiência caso falem publicamente. Já vi essa ameaça implícita em muitas ocasiões em investigações federais, com agentes da inteligência e até com membros do Congresso dos Estados Unidos de tal modo amordaçados por juramentos e acordos de segredo que não são capazes nem mesmo de revelar atividades criminais dentro do governo por medo de encarceramento.[13]
Notice, this surely means that Al Qaeda had nothing to do with the insider trading.[14] When the evidentiary trail led back to Wall Street, the SEC moved quickly to control the evidence and muzzle potential witnesses. Despite the best efforts of the SEC, a few details did leak to the world press. In mid-October 2001, The Independent (UK) reported that, “To the embarrassment of investigators, it has….emerged that the firm used to buy many of the ‘put’ options (where a trader, in effect, bets on a share price fall) on United Airlines stock was headed until 1998 by Alvin ‘Buzzy’ Krongard, now executive director of the CIA.”[15] The evidence was all the more incriminating, because in at least one case the purchaser failed to collect a reported $2.5 million in profits made from the collapsing share price of UAL stock. The only plausible explanation was that someone at the purchasing bank feared exposure and subsequent arrest. Notem, isso seguramente significa que a Al Qaeda nada teve a ver com o insider trading.[14] Quando a pista de evidências levou a Wall Street, a SEC movimentou-se rapidamente para controlar as evidências e amordaçar testemunhas em potencial. A despeito dos melhores esforços da SEC, alguns detalhes vazaram para a imprensa internacional. Em meados de outubro de 2001, The Independent (Reino Unido) informou que “Para constrangimento dos investigadores, ... veio a saber-se que a firma usada para comprar muitas das opções de 'venda' (onde o operador, na verdade, aposta na queda do preço das ações) das ações da United Airlines havia sido presidida até 1998 por Alvin ‘Buzzy’ Krongard, hoje diretor executivo da CIA.”[15] A evidência era ainda mais incriminadora porque, em pelo menos um caso, o comprador não coletou informados $2,5 milhões de dólares de lucro decorrente do colapso do preço da ação da UAL. A única explicação plausível era alguém do banco comprador ter temido ser identificado e subsequentemente preso.
For the most part, the U.S. press failed to pick up the story, which clearly linked Wall Street and the U.S. intelligence community to the 9/11 attacks. Indeed, the New York Times cooperated with the cover-up.[16] George Tenet writes in his memoirs that he recruited Buzzy Krongard in 1998 to become his deputy at CIA, probably to serve as Tenet’s personal liaison to Wall Street.[17] Until 1997, Krongard was chairman of Alex Brown Inc., America’s oldest investment banking firm. Alex Brown was acquired by Bankers Trust in 1997, which, in turn, was purchased by Deutsche Bank in 1999. In the mid-1990s, Krongard had served as a consultant to CIA director James Woolsey. Na maior parte a imprensa dos Estados Unidos não publicou a história, que ligava claramente Wall Street e a comunidade de inteligência dos Estados Unidos aos ataques do 11/9. Em verdade, o New York Times cooperou com o encobrimento.[16] George Tenet escreve, em suas memórias, ter recrutado Buzzy Krongard em 1998 para tornar-se seu adjunto na CIA, provavelmente para atuar como vínculo pessoal de Tenet com Wall Street.[17] Até 1997, Krongard era chairman do Alex Brown Inc., a mais antiga firma de investimento bancário dos Estados Unidos. O Alex Brown foi adquirido pelo Bankers Trust em 1997, o qual, por sua vez, foi comprado pelo Deutsche Bank em 1999. Em meados dos anos 1990 Krongard havia atuado como consutor do diretor da CIA James Woolsey.
In 1998, Banker’s Trust-Alex Brown refused to cooperate with a Senate subcommittee which, at the time, was conducting hearings on the involvement of U.S. banks in money laundering activities.[18] At the time, Banker’s Trust, like other large U.S. banks, was in the business of private banking. This means that Banker’s Trust catered to unnamed wealthy clients for the purpose of setting up shell companies in foreign jurisdictions, such as on the Isle of Jersey, where effective bank regulation and oversight are nonexistent. According to Ruppert, Krongard’s last job at Alex Brown was to oversee “private client relations.”[19] This means that Krongard personally arranged confidential transactions and transfers for the bank’s unnamed wealthy clientele. Em 1998, o Banker’s Trust-Alex Brown recusou-se a cooperar com a subcomissão do Senado que, à época, estava conduzindo audiências acerca do envolvimento de bancos dos Estados Unidos em atividades de lavagem de dinheiro.[18] À época, o Banker’s Trust, como outros grandes bancos dos Estados Unidos, atuava na área de private banking. Isso significa que o Banker’s Trust atendia clientes ricos não identificados para o propósito de estabelecer shell companies [companhias fictícias] em jurisdições estrangeiras, tais como na Ilha de Jersey, onde não existem, na prática, regulamentação e fiscalização bancárias. De acordo com Ruppert, a última função de Krongard na Alex Brown foi supervisar “relações privadas com clientes.”[19] Isso significa que Krongard organizava transações e transferências confidenciais para a clientela rica não identificada do banco.
Private banks typically offer a range of services to their clients for the purpose of shielding them from oversight. Private banks set up multiple offshore accounts in multiple locations under multiple names. They also facilitate the quick, confidential and hard-to-trace transfer of money across jurisdictional boundaries. In many such cases, the private banks do not even know who owns the account; which, of course, means that not even the bankers can follow the transactions with “due diligence.” Many private banks do not even try, for fear of scaring away business, especially from foreign clients. Even though private bankers are responsible for enforcing legal controls against money laundering, where such laws exist, in practice, oversight is typically weak or nonexistent. I was shocked to learn that although it is illegal for U.S. banks to launder ill-gotten money that originates within the United States, it is not illegal for them to accept dirty money from elsewhere. No surprise then, that many U.S. banks openly solicit business from Central American drug lords, arms merchants, and other shady entities. Os private banks oferecem normalmente um elenco de serviços a seus clientes visante a protegê-los de sofrerem supervisão. Os private banks abrem múltiplas contas no exterior em múltiplos locais sob múltiplos nomes. Também facilitam transferência rápida, confidencial e difícil de rastrear de dinheiro através de fronteiras jurisdicionais. Em muitos casos da espécie os private banks nem sequer sabem quem é o titular da conta; o que, naturalmente, significa que nem mesmo os banqueiros conseguem acompanhar as transações com a “diligência devida.” Muitos private banks nem tentam fazer isso, por medo de prejudicar os negócios, especialmente com clientes do exterior. Embora os private bankers [banqueiros private] sejam responsáveis por fazer cumprir os controles legais contra lavagem de dinheiro, onde tais leis existam, na prática a supervisão é normalmente frouxa ou inexistente. Fiquei escandalizado ao saber que embora seja ilegal os bancos dos Estados Unidos lavarem dinheiro ganho ilicitamente que tenha origem dentro dos Estados Unidos, não é ilegal eles aceitarem dinheiro sujo proveniente de outros lugares. Não é de surpreender, pois, que muitos bancos dos Estados Unidos abertamente busquem negócios com barões da droga da América Central, vendedores de armas e outras entidades duvidosas.
For these reasons, it is little wonder that over the last several decades, law enforcement has failed to stem the growing international flood of laundered drug money and other illicit assets. Their failure has been spectacular. In 1999, a consensus of experts in Germany, Switzerland and at the U.S. Treasury agreed that 99.9% of laundered money routinely escapes detection. The experts estimated that the annual total was between $500 billion and a trillion dollars, a mind-boggling number, about half of which is washed into the U.S. economy, the rest into Europe.[20] Por esses motivos não é de admirar que, nas últimas décadas, a repressão tenha fracassado em conter a crescente inundação internacional de dinheiro de drogas lavado e outros ativos ilícitos. O fracasso tem sido espetacular. Em 1999 um consenso de especialistas de Alemanha, Suíça e Estados Unidos concordou em que 99,9% do dinheiro lavado escapa sistematicamente de detecção. Esses especialistas avaliaram que o total anual situava-se entre $500 biliões e um trilião de dólares, número estontente, cerca de metade do qual é lavado na economia dos Estados Unidos, e o resto na Europa.[20]
After “Buzzy” Krongard’s departure to the CIA, his successor at Alex Brown was his former deputy Mayo Shattuck III, who had worked at the bank for many years. In 1997, Shattuck helped Krongard engineer the merger with Banker’s Trust, and he stayed on after Deutsche Bank acquired Bankers Trust – Alex Brown in 1999.[21] Depóis da partida de “Buzzy” Krongard para a CIA, seu sucessor no Alex Brown foi seu antigo adjunto Mayo Shattuck III, que havia trabalhado no banco por muitos anos. Em 1997, Shattuck ajudou Krongard a projetar a fusão com o Banker’s Trust, e continuou no emprego depois que o Deutsche Bank adquiriu o Bankers Trust – Alex Brown em 1999.[21]
According to the New York Times, Bankers Trust was “one of the most loosely managed [banks] on Wall Street,” and during the 1990s was repeatedly rocked by scandal. In 1994, clients and regulators accused the bank “of misleading customers about its risky derivative products.” The case went viral when tape recordings were made public that showed bank salesmen snickering about ripping off naive customers. In 1999, Banker’s Trust pled guilty to criminal conspiracy charges, after it was revealed that top-level executives had created a slush fund out of at least $20 million in unclaimed funds.[22] Bankers Trust had to pay a $63 million fine and would have been forced to close it doors but for the fact it was acquired, just at this time, by Deutsche Bank, Europe’s largest bank. De acordo com o New York Times, o Bankers Trust era “um dos [bancos] mais frouxamente administrdos de Wall Street,” e durante os anos 1990 foi repetidamente sacudido por escândalos. Em 1994, clientes e regulamentadores acusaram o banco de “enganar os clientes no tocante a seus arriscados produtos derivativos.” O caso foi amplamente noticiado quando gravações em fita foram tornadas públicas mostrando vendedores de produtos do banco fazendo galhofa por terem iludido clientes ingênuos. Em 1999 o Banker’s Trust declarou-se culpado ao ser acusado de conspiração criminal, depois de ser revelado que executivos de alto escalão haviam criado um slush fund [fundo secreto para uso ilegal/desonesto] a partir de pelo menos $20 milhões de dólares em recursos financeiros não reclamados.[22] O Bankers Trust teve de pagar multa de $63 milhões de dólares e teria sido forçado a fechar as portas não fora o fato de ser adquirido, justamente nessa hora, pelo Deutsche Bank, o maior banco da Europa.
According to the New York Times, Mayo Shattuck III “was made co-head of investment banking in January [2001], overseeing Deutsche Bank’s 400 brokers who cater to wealthy clients.”[23] It is curious that Shattuck resigned immediately after the 9/11 attacks. De acordo com o New York Times, Mayo Shattuck III “foi feito codirigente do banco de investimento em janeiro [de 2001], supervisando 400 corretores do Deutsche Bank que atendem clientes ricos.”[23] Curioso Shattuck ter renunciado imediatamente após os ataques do 11/9.
In a footnote buried on page 499, the 9/11 Commission Report alludes to Mayo Shattuck III’s likely role in purchasing the United Airlines put options just prior to 9/11. The note fails to mention Shattuck and Deutsche Bank by name, but attempts to explain away the charges of insider trading, as follows: Numa nota de rodapé sepultada na página 499 o Relatório da Comissão do 11/9 alude à provavel papel de Mayo Shattuck III ao comprar as opções de venda da United Airlines logo antes do 11/9. A nota deixa de mencionar Shattuck e o Deutsche Bank pelo nome, mas tenta explicar as acusações de insider trading, como segue:
A single US-based institutional investor with no conceivable ties to al Qaeda purchased 95% of the UAL puts on September 6 [2001] as part of a strategy that also included buying 115,000 shares of American on September 10. Similarly, much of the seemingly suspicious trading on September 10 was traced to a specific US-based options trading newsletter….which recommended these trades.[24] Um único investidor institucional sediado nos Estados Unidos com não concebíveis vínculos com a al Qaeda comprou 95% das opções de venda da UAL em 6 de setembro [de 2001] como parte de uma estratégia que também incluiu comprar 115.000 ações American em 10 de setembro. Similarmente, muito do aparentemente suspeito trading em 10 de setembro foi rastreado até uma newsletter específica de negócios com opções sediada nos Estados Unidos.... que recomendou essas operações.[24]
Evidently, we are supposed to conclude that “American” means American Airlines. But here it could just as easily refer to American Express. If Deutsche Bank’s pre-9/11 trading was truly hedged, as the 9/11 Commission Report contends in the footnote, then it would not meet the definition of informed or insider trading. However, without more information, it is not possible to confirm or refute the facts in this particular case. Still, the commission’s token explanation is not convincing. Two statistical studies since published reported an unusual volume in options trading for both United and American airlines in the days before 9/11. The author of the first study wrote that the results are “consistent with investors trading on advance knowledge of the attacks.”[25] The second paper, by the Swiss Banking Institute, reached the same conclusion.[26] A third study looked at the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index (SPX index options) and found “abnormal trading volumes in September 2001 OTM, ATM and ITM SPX index put options, and September 2001 ITM SPX index call options.” The authors concluded that there is “credible circumstantial evidence to support the insider trading claim.”[27] Evidentemente, supõe-se que devamos concluir “American” significar American Airlines. Aqui, porém, poderá de modo igualmente fácil referir-se a American Express. Se as operações anteriores ao 11/9 do Deutsche Bank estavam realmente hedgeadas, como o Relatório da Comissão do 11/9 contende na nota de rodapé, então elas não se enquadrariam na definição de informed ou insider trading. Entretanto, sem mais informação não é possível confirmar ou refutar os fatos nesse caso em particular. Ainda assim, a explicação perfunctória não é convincente. Dois estudos estatísticos publicados desde então informaram volume inusitado de negociação de opções no tocante a ambas empresas aéreas, United e American, nos dias anteriores ao 11/9. O autor do primeiro estudo escreveu que os resultados são “consistentes com operações de investidores com conhecimento antecipado dos ataques.”[25] O segundo estudo, efetuado pelo Swiss Banking Institute, chegou à mesma conclusão.[26] Terceiro estudo considerou o Índice 500 da Standard & Poor’s (opções do índice SPX) e descobriu “volumes anormais de opções de venda, em setembro de 2001, nos índices OTM, ATM e ITM SPX e de opções de compra, em setembro de 2001, no índice ITM SPX.” Os autores concluíram que há “evidência circunstancial digna de crédito em apoio da afirmação de insider trading.”[27]
Notice also, the commission makes no mention in its footnote of the 36 other companies identified by the SEC in its insider trading probe. What about the pre-9/11 surge in call options for Raytheon, for instance, or the spike in put options for the behemoth Morgan Stanley, which had offices in WTC 2? The 9/11 Commission Report offers not one word of explanation about any of this. The truth, we must conclude, is to be found between the lines in the report’s conspicuous avoidance of the lion’s share of the insider trading issue. Indeed, if the trading was truly “innocuous,” as the report states, then why did the SEC muzzle potential whistleblowers by deputizing everyone involved with its investigation? The likely answer is that so many players on Wall Street were involved that the SEC could not risk an open process, for fear of exposing the unthinkable. This would explain why the SEC limited the flow of information to those with a “need to know,” which, of course, means that very few participants in the SEC investigation had the full picture. It would also explain why the SEC ultimately named no names. All of which hints at the true and frightening extent of criminal activity on Wall Street in the days and hours before 9/11. The SEC was like a surgeon who opens a patient on the operating room table to remove a tumor, only to sew him back up again after finding that the cancer has metastasized through the system. Notem, também, que a comissão não faz menção, em sua nota de rodapé, às 36 outras empresas identificadas pela SEC em sua investigação de insider trading. E quanto ao aumento anterior ao 11/9 em opções de compra da Raytheon, por exemplo, ou à crista das opções de venda do colosso Morgan Stanley, que tinha escritórios no WTC 2? O Relatório da Comissão do 11/9 não oferece sequer uma palavra de explicação acerca de nada disso. A verdade, temos de concluir, deverá ser encontrada entre as linhas da conspícua evitação do Relatório de falar da parte do leão na questão do insider trading. Na verdade, se a negociação foi realmente “inócua,” como diz o relatório, então por que a SEC amordaçou denunciantes em potencial ao atribuir funções oficiais a todo mundo envolvido com a investigação? A resposta provável é que tantos atores em Wall Street estiveram envolvidos que a SEC não podia arriscar-se a qualquer processo aberto, por temor de pôr à mostra o impensável. Isso explicaria por que a SEC limitou o fluxo de informação a aqueles que “precisam saber,” o que, obviamente, significa que muito poucos participantes da investigação da SEC tinham visão geral do cenário. Isso explicaria também por que a SEC, por fim, não deu nomes. Tudo isso sugere indiretamente a verdadeira e assustadora extensão da atividade criminal em Wall Street nos dias e horas que antecederam o 11/9. A SEC foi como um cirurgião que abre um paciente na mesa de operação para remover um tumor, só para costurá-lo outra vez depois de descobrir metástase do câncer atingindo todo o sistema.
At an early stage of its investigation, perhaps before SEC officials were fully aware of the implications, the SEC did recommend that the FBI investigate two suspicious transactions. We know about this thanks to a 9/11 Commission memorandum declassified in May 2009 which summarizes an August 2003 meeting at which FBI agents briefed the commission on the insider trading issue. The document indicates that the SEC passed the information about the suspicious trading to the FBI on September 21, 2001, just ten days after the 9/11 attacks.[28] Em estágio precoce de sua investigação, antes talvez de as autoridades da SEC estarem totalmente cientes das implicações, a SEC recomendou que o FBI investigasse duas transações suspeitas. Sabemos disso graças ao memorando da Comissão do 11/9 que deixou de ser secreto em maio de 2009, o qual resume uma reunião de agosto de 2003 na qual agentes do FBI fizeram para a comissão um apanhado da questão do insider trading. O documento revela que a SEC passou para o FBI as informações acerca das negociações suspeitas em 21 de setembro de 2001, exatamente dez dias depois dos ataques do 11/9.[28]
Although the names in both cases are censored from the declassified document, thanks to some nice detective work by Kevin Ryan we know whom (in one case) the SEC was referring to.[29] The identity of the suspicious trader is a stunner that should have become prime-time news on every network, world-wide. Kevin Ryan was able to fill in the blanks because, fortunately, the censor left enough details in the document to identify the suspicious party who, as it turns out, was none other than Wirt Walker III, a distant cousin to then-President G.W. Bush. Several days before 9/11, Walker and his wife Sally purchased 56,000 shares of stock in Stratesec, one of the companies that provided security at the World Trade Center up until the day of the attacks. Notably, Stratesec also provided security at Dulles International Airport, where AA 77 took off on 9/11, and also security for United Airlines, which owned two of the other three allegedly hijacked aircraft. At the time, Walker was a director of Stratesec. Amazingly, Bush’s brother Marvin was also on the board. Walker’s investment paid off handsomely, gaining $50,000 in value in a matter of a few days. Given the links to the World Trade Center and the Bush family, the SEC lead should have sparked an intensive FBI investigation. Yet, incredibly, in a mind-boggling example of criminal malfeasance, the FBI concluded that because Walker and his wife had “no ties to terrorism … there was no reason to pursue the investigation.” The FBI did not conduct a single interview. Embora os nomes, em ambos os casos, estejam censurados do documento que deixou de ser secreto, graças a bom trabalho de detetive de Kevin Ryan, sabemos a quem (em um dos casos) a SEC se estava referindo.[29] A identidade do negociador suspeito é chocante a tal ponto que a informação deveria ter-se tornado notícia no horário nobre em toda rede, no mundo todo. Kevin Ryan conseguiu preencher os brancos porque, felizmente, o censor deixou detalhes suficientes no documento para identificar a parte suspeita que, vem-se a saber, não foi outra que não Wirt Walker III, primo distante do então Presidente G.W. Bush. Vários dias antes do 11/9, Walker e sua mulher Sally compraram 56.000 ações da Stratesec, uma das empresas que proporcionavam segurança ao World Trade Center até o dia dos ataques. Notavelmente, a Stratesec também proporcionava segurança no Dulles International Airport, de onde o AA 77 levantou voo no 11/9, e também fornecia segurança para a United Airlines, dona dos outros três supostamente sequestrados aviões. À época, Walker era diretor da Stratesec. Surpreendentemente, o irmão de Bush, Marvin, também era membro da diretoria. O investimento de Walker gerou belos ganhos, no valor de $50.000 em poucos dias. Dados os laços com o World Trade Center e com a família Bush, a iniciativa da SEC deveria ter desencadeado investigação intensa pelo FBI. No entanto, incrivelmente, num exemplo difícil de entender de incompetência criminal, o FBI concluiu que, como Walker e sua mulher “não tinham laços com o terrorismo … não havia motivo para prosseguir com a investigação.” O FBI não fez uma única entrevista.
The 9/11 Commission Report also fails to mention the other compelling evidence for insider trading that I have not yet discussed, namely, the approximately 400 computer hard drives found by workmen in the ruins of the WTC. According to Reuters and CNN, in the period after 9/11, U.S. credit card, telecommunications and accounting firms hired a German company named Convar to recoup data from the damaged hard drives.[30] Convar got the contract because, two years before, it had developed a proprietary method for recovering data using a cutting edge laser scanning technology. Peter Wagner, a Convar spokesman, told CNN that the new laser process makes it “possible to read the individual drive surfaces and then create a virtual drive.” As of December 2001, Convar had examined 39 hard drives and in most cases succeeded in recovering 100% of the data. The company was specifically searching for encryption keys, indicating a financial record. Convar found evidence stored on the drives of “an unexplained surge in transactions prior to the attacks.” Convar director Peter Henschel told CNN that “unusually large sums of money, perhaps more than $100 million, were rushed through the computers as the disaster unfolded”. Said Henschel: “The suspicion is that insider information about the attack was used to send financial transaction commands and authorizations in the belief that amidst all the chaos the criminals would have a good head start…..Of course it’s possible that Americans went on an absolute shopping binge, that Tuesday morning. But at this point there are many transactions that cannot be accounted for.” After the initial story by CNN and Reuters, the issue of the WTC hard drives disappeared from the news, and nothing has been heard since. Although reports on the Internet that Kroll purchased Convar remain unsubstantiated, it is nonetheless clear that someone made the story (and the evidence) go away.[31] But what reason would they possibly have for doing so? Unless the initial indications from Convar that insider trading had occurred were correct. O Relatório da Comissão do 11/9 também deixa de mencionar a outra irresistível evidência de insider trading que ainda não discuti, isto é, os aproximadamente 400 discos rígidos de computador encontrados por trabalhadores nas ruínas do WTC. De acordo com Reuters e CNN, no período após o 11/9, firmas de cartão de crédito, telecomunicações e contabilidade dos Estados Unidos contrataram uma companhia alemã chamada Convar para recuperar dados dos discos rígidos danificados.[30] A Convar obteve o contrato porque, dois anos antes, havia desenvolvido método patenteado para recuperar dados usando tecnologia de ponta de escaneamento por laser. Peter Wagner, porta-foz da Convar, disse à CNN que o novo processo com laser torna “possível ler as superfícies individuais do disco e em seguida criar um disco virtual.” Ao chegar dezembro de 2001 a Convar havia examinado 39 discos rígidos e, na maioria dos casos, conseguira recuperar 100% dos dados. A empresa buscava especificamente chaves de criptografia reveladoras de registros financeiros. A Convar encontrou evidência, armazenada nos discos, de “inexplicável aumento de transações antes dos ataques.” O diretor da Convar Peter Henschel disse à CNN que “somas inusitadamente grandes de dinheiro, talvez mais de $100 milhões de dólares, foram processadas nos computadores enquanto o desastre se desenrolava”. Disse Henschel: “A suspeita é de que informação privilegiada a respeito do ataque tenha sido usada para mandar comandos de transações e autorizações financeiras na crença de que, em meio a todo o caos, os criminosos teriam boa dianteira..... Obviamente é possível que os estadunidenses tenham entrado numa folia absoluta de compras naquela manhã de terça-feira. Mas até este momento há muitas transações que não podem ser explicadas.” Depois da informação inicial pela CNN e pela Reuters, a questão dos discos rígidos do WTC desapareceu do noticiário, e nada se ouviu a respeito desde então. Embora notícias na Internet de que a Kroll comprou a Convar permaneçam sem comprovação, está todavia claro que alguém fez a notícia (e a evidência) sair de cena.[31] Que motivo terá tido, contudo, para fazê-lo? A menos que as revelações iniciais da Convar de ter havido insider trading estivessem corretas.
The above CNN quote by Peter Henschel that “unusually large sums of money, perhaps more than $100 million, were rushed through the computers as the disaster unfolded,” was later confirmed in truly chilling fashion by a Deutsche Bank New York branch employee who survived the attacks. The whistleblower, who insists on remaining anonymous for his own protection, told Mike Ruppert that “about five minutes before the attack the entire Deutsche Bank computer system had been taken over by something external that no one in the office recognized, and every file was downloaded at lightning speed to an unknown location” (emphasis added).[32] Here, the important phrase is “five minutes before the attack.” Chilling indeed. A citação acima da CNN acerca de Peter Henschel de “somas inusitadamente grandes de dinheiro, talvez mais de $100 milhões de dólares, foram processadas nos computadores enquanto o desastre se desenrolava,” foi posteriormente confirmada de maneira realmente assustadora por um empregado da filial de New York do Deutsche Bank que sobreviveu aos ataques. O denunciante, que insiste em permanecer anônimo para sua própria proteção, disse a Mike Ruppert que “cerca de cinco minutos antes do ataque o sistema inteiro de computação do Deutsche Bank foi tomado por algo externo que ninguém no escritório reconhecia, e todos os arquivos foram baixados em velocidade inacreditável para local desconhecido” (ênfase acrescentada).[32] Aqui, a frase importante é “cinco minutos antes do ataque.” Realmente assustador.
To be continued… Continua…
Notes Notas
[1] World News Tonight, 20 September 2001. [1] World News Tonight, 20 September 2001.
[2] Dave Eberhart, “Still Silence From 9-11 Stock Speculation Probe”, NewsMax, June 3, 2002, http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2002/6/2/62018.shtml [2] Dave Eberhart, “Still Silence From 9-11 Stock Speculation Probe”, NewsMax, June 3, 2002, http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2002/6/2/62018.shtml
[3] William Drozdiak, “‘Insider trading’ by terrorists is suspected in Europe”, Miami Herald, September 24, 2001, http://web.archive.org/web/20011109160700/www.miami.com/herald/special/news/worldtrade/digdocs/099922.htm [3] William Drozdiak, “‘Insider trading’ by terrorists is suspected in Europe”, Miami Herald, September 24, 2001, http://web.archive.org/web/20011109160700/www.miami.com/herald/special/news/worldtrade/digdocs/099922.htm
[4] James Doran, “Insider Trading Apparently Based on Foreknowledge of 9/11 Attacks,” London Times, September 18, 2001. Archived at http://911research.wtc7.net/cache/sept11/londontimes_insidertrading.html [4] James Doran, “Insider Trading Apparently Based on Foreknowledge of 9/11 Attacks,” London Times, September 18, 2001. Archived at http://911research.wtc7.net/cache/sept11/londontimes_insidertrading.html
[5] Christian Berthelsen, Scott Winokur, “Suspicious profits sit uncollected,” San Francisco Chronicle, September 29, 2001. Archived at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2001/09/29/MN186128.DTL [5] Christian Berthelsen, Scott Winokur, “Suspicious profits sit uncollected,” San Francisco Chronicle, September 29, 2001. Archived at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2001/09/29/MN186128.DTL
[6] “Profiting from Disaster,” CBS Evening News, September 19, 2001. Archived at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2001/09/19/eveningnews/main311834.shtml [6] “Profiting from Disaster,” CBS Evening News, September 19, 2001. Archived at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2001/09/19/eveningnews/main311834.shtml
[7] Michelle Ciarrocca, “Post-9/11 Economic Windfalls for Arms Manufacturers,” Foreign Policy in Focus, September 2002. Posted at http://old.911digitalarchive.org/objects/50.pdf [7] Michelle Ciarrocca, “Post-9/11 Economic Windfalls for Arms Manufacturers,” Foreign Policy in Focus, September 2002. Posted at http://old.911digitalarchive.org/objects/50.pdf
[8] Bank of America among 38 stocks in SEC’s attack probe,” Bloomberg News, October 3, 2001. Archived at http://911research.wtc7.net/cache/sept11/bloombberg_BAamong38.html [8] Bank of America among 38 stocks in SEC’s attack probe,” Bloomberg News, October 3, 2001. Archived at http://911research.wtc7.net/cache/sept11/bloombberg_BAamong38.html
[9] Cited by Barry Grey, “Suspicious trading points to advance knowledge by big investors of September 11 attacks,” World Socialist Web Site, October 5, 2001. Posted at http://www.wsws.org/articles/2001/oct2001/bond-o05.shtml [9] Cited by Barry Grey, “Suspicious trading points to advance knowledge by big investors of September 11 attacks,” World Socialist Web Site, October 5, 2001. Posted at http://www.wsws.org/articles/2001/oct2001/bond-o05.shtml
[10] Bloomberg News, October 3, 2001. The list included stocks of American, United, Continental, Northwest, Southwest and US Airways airlines, as well as Martin, Boeing, Lockheed Martin Corp., AIG, American Express Corp, American International Group, AMR Corporation, Axa SA, Bank of America Corp, Bank of New York Corp, Bank One Corp, Cigna Group, CNA Financial, Carnival Corp, Chubb Group, John Hancock Financial Services, Hercules Inc, L-3 Communications Holdings, Inc., LTV Corporation, Marsh & McLennan Cos. Inc., MetLife, Progressive Corp., General Motors, Raytheon, W.R. Grace, Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., Lone Star Technologies, American Express, the Citigroup Inc. ,Royal & Sun Alliance, Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc., Vornado Reality Trust, Morgan Stanley, Dean Witter & Co., XL Capital Ltd., and Bear Stearns. [10] Bloomberg News, October 3, 2001. The list included stocks of American, United, Continental, Northwest, Southwest and US Airways airlines, as well as Martin, Boeing, Lockheed Martin Corp., AIG, American Express Corp, American International Group, AMR Corporation, Axa SA, Bank of America Corp, Bank of New York Corp, Bank One Corp, Cigna Group, CNA Financial, Carnival Corp, Chubb Group, John Hancock Financial Services, Hercules Inc, L-3 Communications Holdings, Inc., LTV Corporation, Marsh & McLennan Cos. Inc., MetLife, Progressive Corp., General Motors, Raytheon, W.R. Grace, Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., Lone Star Technologies, American Express, the Citigroup Inc. ,Royal & Sun Alliance, Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc., Vornado Reality Trust, Morgan Stanley, Dean Witter & Co., XL Capital Ltd., and Bear Stearns.
[11] Erin E. Arvedlund, “Follow The Money: Terrorist Conspirators Could Have Profited More From Fall Of Entire Market Than Single Stocks,” Barron’s (Dow Jones and Company), 6 October 2001. [11] Erin E. Arvedlund, “Follow The Money: Terrorist Conspirators Could Have Profited More From Fall Of Entire Market Than Single Stocks,” Barron’s (Dow Jones and Company), 6 October 2001.
[12] Scott Winokur, “SEC wants data-sharing system,” San Francisco Chronicle, October 19, 2001. Posted at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2001/10/19/BU142745.DTL [12] Scott Winokur, “SEC wants data-sharing system,” San Francisco Chronicle, October 19, 2001. Posted at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2001/10/19/BU142745.DTL
[13] Michael Ruppert, Crossing the Rubicon,(New Society Publishers, 2004), p. 243. [13] Michael Ruppert, Crossing the Rubicon,(New Society Publishers, 2004), p. 243.
[14] Bloomberg reportedly acknowledged the fact in a September 2003 newswire. Although the wire has since disappeared from the Internet, the text is archived at http://s15.invisionfree.com/Loose_Change_Forum/ar/t1699.htm [14] Bloomberg reportedly acknowledged the fact in a September 2003 newswire. Although the wire has since disappeared from the Internet, the text is archived at http://s15.invisionfree.com/Loose_Change_Forum/ar/t1699.htm
[15] Chris Blackhurst, “Mystery of terror ‘insider dealers’,” The Independent, October 14, 2001, posted at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/mystery-of-terror-insider-dealers-631325.html [15] Chris Blackhurst, “Mystery of terror ‘insider dealers’,” The Independent, October 14, 2001, posted at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/mystery-of-terror-insider-dealers-631325.html
[16] “Whether advance knowledge of U.S. attacks was used for profit,” New York Times, October 1, 2001. Archived at http://www.hinduonnet.com/2001/10/01/stories/06010006.htm [16] “Whether advance knowledge of U.S. attacks was used for profit,” New York Times, October 1, 2001. Archived at http://www.hinduonnet.com/2001/10/01/stories/06010006.htm
[17] George Tenet, At the Center of the Storm, Harper Collins, New York,  2007, p. 19. [17] George Tenet, At the Center of the Storm, Harper Collins, New York,  2007, p. 19.
[18] Hearings before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 106th Congress, November 9 and 10, 1999, p.879. Posted at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=106_senate_hearings&docid=f:61699.pdf [18] Hearings before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 106th Congress, November 9 and 10, 1999, p.879. Posted at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=106_senate_hearings&docid=f:61699.pdf
[19] http://www.fromthewilderness.com/free/ww3/10_09_01_krongard.html [19] http://www.fromthewilderness.com/free/ww3/10_09_01_krongard.html
[20] Raymond W. Baker, “The Biggest Loophole in the Free Market System,” The Washington Quarterly, Autumn 1999, p. 29. Posted at (see p. 1061) http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=106_senate_hearings&docid=f:61699.pdf [20] Raymond W. Baker, “The Biggest Loophole in the Free Market System,” The Washington Quarterly, Autumn 1999, p. 29. Posted at (see p. 1061) http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=106_senate_hearings&docid=f:61699.pdf
[21] “Chief Steps Down At Alex Brown,” New York Times, September 15, 2001. [21] “Chief Steps Down At Alex Brown,” New York Times, September 15, 2001.
[22] Timothy L. O’Brien, “The Deep Slush at Bankers Trust,” The New York Times, May 30, 1999. Posted at http://www.nytimes.com/1999/05/30/business/the-deep-slush-at-bankers-trust.html?src=pm [22] Timothy L. O’Brien, “The Deep Slush at Bankers Trust,” The New York Times, May 30, 1999. Posted at http://www.nytimes.com/1999/05/30/business/the-deep-slush-at-bankers-trust.html?src=pm
[23] “Chief Steps Down At Alex Brown,” New York Times, September 15, 2001. [23] “Chief Steps Down At Alex Brown,” New York Times, September 15, 2001.
[24] 9/11 Commission Report, W.W. Norton, 2004, p. 499. [24] 9/11 Commission Report, W.W. Norton, 2004, p. 499.
[25] Allen M. Poteshman, “Unusual Option Market Activity and the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001,” The Journal of Business, 2006, vol. 79, no. 4, http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/503645 [25] Allen M. Poteshman, “Unusual Option Market Activity and the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001,” The Journal of Business, 2006, vol. 79, no. 4, http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/503645
[26] Marc Chesney, et al, “Detecting Informed Trading Activities in the Options Markets,” Social Sciences Research Network, 13 January 2010, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1522157 [26] Marc Chesney, et al, “Detecting Informed Trading Activities in the Options Markets,” Social Sciences Research Network, 13 January 2010, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1522157
[27] Wing-Keung Wong, et al, “Was there Abnormal Trading in the S&P 500 Index Options Prior to the September 11 Attacks?,” Social Sciences Research Network, April 2010, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1588523 [27] Wing-Keung Wong, et al, “Was there Abnormal Trading in the S&P 500 Index Options Prior to the September 11 Attacks?,” Social Sciences Research Network, April 2010, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1588523
[28] 9/11 Commission memorandum entitled “FBI Briefing on Trading”, prepared by Doug Greenburg, 18 August 2003, p. 4-5. Posted at http://media.nara.gov/9-11/MFR/t-0148-911MFR-00269.pdf [28] 9/11 Commission memorandum entitled “FBI Briefing on Trading”, prepared by Doug Greenburg, 18 August 2003, p. 4-5. Posted at http://media.nara.gov/9-11/MFR/t-0148-911MFR-00269.pdf
[29] Kevin Ryan, “Evidence for Informed Trading on the Attacks of September 11,” Foreign Policy Journal, November 18, 2010. Posted at http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2010/11/18/evidence-for-informed-trading-on-the-attacks-of-september-11/all/1/ [29] Kevin Ryan, “Evidence for Informed Trading on the Attacks of September 11,” Foreign Policy Journal, November 18, 2010. Posted at http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2010/11/18/evidence-for-informed-trading-on-the-attacks-of-september-11/all/1/
[30] “German firm probes final World Trade Center deals,” Reuters, December 17, 2001. Posted at http://www.rediff.com/money/2001/dec/17wtc.htm
Rick Perera, “Computer disk drives from WTC could yield clues,” CNN, December 20, 2001. Posted at http://archives.cnn.com/2001/TECH/industry/12/20/wtc.harddrives.idg/
[30] “German firm probes final World Trade Center deals,” Reuters, December 17, 2001. Posted at http://www.rediff.com/money/2001/dec/17wtc.htm
Rick Perera, “Computer disk drives from WTC could yield clues,” CNN, December 20, 2001. Posted at http://archives.cnn.com/2001/TECH/industry/12/20/wtc.harddrives.idg/
[31] Michael Fury, “The Ghost in the Machines: Evidence of Foreknowledge in the WTC Hard Drive Recoveries,” Journal of 9/11 Studies, December 2008. Posted at http://www.journalof911studies.com/volume/2008/GhostWTC.pdf [31] Michael Fury, “The Ghost in the Machines: Evidence of Foreknowledge in the WTC Hard Drive Recoveries,” Journal of 9/11 Studies, December 2008. Posted at http://www.journalof911studies.com/volume/2008/GhostWTC.pdf
[32] Crossing the Rubicon, p. 244. [32] Crossing the Rubicon, p. 244.
Mark H. Gaffney is the author of The 9/11 Mystery Plane and the Vanishing of America (2008). His next book, Black 9/11, will be released later this year. 9/11 Whistleblowers are encouraged to contact Mark at markhgaffney@earthlink.net Read more articles by Mark H. Gaffney. Mark H. Gaffney é autor de O Avião Misterioso do 11/9 e o Fenecimento dos Estados Unidos (2008). Seu próximo livro, 11 de Setembro Negro, será publicado este ano. Denunciantes do 11/9 são estimulados a entrar em contato com Mark em markhgaffney@earthlink.net Leia mais artigos de Mark H. Gaffney.


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